Printed by Collingwood and Co. Oxford.

THE

EXAMINER EXAMINED,

OR

LOGIC VINDICATED.

ADDRESSED TO THE

JUNIOR STUDENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

BY A GRADUATE.

Aut hæc in nostros fabricata est machina muros,
Aut aliquis latet error. Equo ne credite, Teucri.

OXFORD,

PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR:

And sold by J. Cooke, J. Parker, M. and R. Bliss, and J. Munday;

and by J. Mackinlay, Strand, London.

1809.

Collingwood and Co. Oxford.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page

INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS — — — — — — 1
General, but imperfect, list of errors in *Logic made easy* — — 6
Absurdities pointed out in Mr. Kett's Introduction — — — 9
Strange notion of the use of the First Operation of the Mind — 10
Pseudo-syllogism, given by Mr. K. as a Pattern — — — 11
Some remarks on the nature of the Syllogism — — — 12
Extraordinary errors of Mr. K. respecting the Logical distinction of words — — — — — — — — — 13
Categories and Predicables confounded by Mr. K. — — — 14
Mr. K.'s illustration of the Predicables in comparing Man and Horse, examined * — — — — — — — — 15
Subaltern Genera and Species, miscalled by Mr. K. — — — 16
Mr. K.'s Definitions examined — — — — — — ib.
Mr. K.'s notion of a Proposition — — — — — 18
Mr. K.'s way of making Logic easy, exemplified — — — 19
Meaning of the word *Distributed* — — — — — ib.
Conversion of Propositions. Mr. K. ignorant of the force of the technical line he produces — — — — — — 20
Opposition of Propositions. Gross errors — — — — 21
Mr. K.'s definition of Reasoning, with his first examples of that process of the mind — — — — — — — — ib.
Crowd of blunders about Major, Minor, and Middle term — 22, 23
Aldrich, mutilated and misunderstood. Mr. K. wrong wherever he departs from him — — — — — — — — 23
Errors, which would endanger a candidate for the degree of B. A. ib.
Syllogisms of the *Cracker* kind — — — — — — 25
REDUCTION. Mr. K. ignorant both of its *use* and *practice* — — ib.
HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. More *Crackers*. False principle — 27
Mr. K.'s first Enthymem examined — — — — — 28
Enthymematic sentence, made by Mr. K. not Enthymematic — 30
Remarks on the importance of the right use of words — — — 31

* N. B. The words [p. 15. l. 22.] "which is impossible" are introduced, because by *proprium* is always meant *specific proprium*, unless *generic* is expressly added. In giving examples of the Predicables, which is what Mr. K. is upon, p. 23. it is always so understood.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

	Page
Remarks on the Enthymem — — — — — —	35
INDUCTION. *Subject considered at some length* — — —	ib.
General Summary of the Aristotelic system — — — —	42
ON FALLACIES — — — — — — — —	43
Almost the whole of Mr. K.'s chapter on Fallacies erroneous —	45
Curious examples how things may be made easy — — —	48
Mr. K.'s notion of Logic — — — — — —	49
Cursory account of the remainder of Mr. K.'s book — — —	50
Some opinions of the author concerning Logic —	50, to the end.

ERRATUM.

P. 15. l. 18. *for* p. 25. *read* p. 23.

MY FRIENDS AND FELLOW STUDENTS,

ANXIETY for your good, and for the credit of our University, which is now assailed on every side, and by every poisoned weapon the press can discharge, are the sole motives which lead me to call your attention by this address. It may be thought presumption in me, who have no titles or trophies of former exploits to display, to enter the lists with an antagonist, whose whole life seems to have been spent among you—who has served some of the most efficient offices in the place—whose works are so numerous, that the bare catalogue of them fatigues the reader; and so much esteemed, that every year produces its harvest, perhaps its double harvest, of new editions.

The motives above assigned might, I confess, have called forth some one superior in rank, and age, and reputation to myself; or they might, perhaps, have justified the exercise of AUTHORITY in the case now before us. But as I do not hear that any such champion is preparing for the field, or that any such interposition is intended, and as the case is urgent, I scruple not to advance, in the confidence which truth inspires; and if what I say is tried by the test of truth, I have no fears for the event. I will not be content with Laocoön, to hurl a single javelin at the monster which is thus insidiously brought within our walls—I will not merely raise a sounding echo from his hollow sides—the whole mass of lurking mischief shall be dragged from its hiding-place, and exposed in the face of day. I only entreat of you patient and impartial attention. Take the book I am examining, and compare it with my book, page by page. If

I accuse the writer falsely in a single instance, read no farther, but cast my book into the fire, and condemn it to eternal infamy. If I make good my accusations, do not let false pity, and that mawkish plea, of age and services and good intentions, shield the accused from justice, or even mitigate his sentence.

When first I saw the advertisement of *Logic made easy*, it was accompanied by a long list of books from the same author. Of these books I have certainly read but few. What I have read appeared to me to contain nothing sound or useful in them. If any thing was true, it was a feeble expansion of what had been better said elsewhere. In general, the conceptions were indistinct and confused; the information scanty and unconnected; the remarks superficial; the errors, beyond all bearing, abundant and disgraceful; the language turgid, frothy, and impotent. Over all of them indeed was thrown a dress, in the very worst taste of modern millinery: not the gorgeous embroidery of Parr—not the stout buckram of Johnson—not the whalebone and point-lace of Gibbon—but a cheap, thin, tawdry, second-hand, threadbare cloak, in cut and colour just what schoolboys call *shabby genteel*, and so flimsy withal in its texture, that it would not bear the handling. Indeed, I am persuaded that there is not a single page in those works, which, in point of style, will stand the test of rigid criticism. Still, if the world liked them, it was no concern of mine, nor of any one else in this place. Provided they did not affect our character, nor tend to corrupt our studies, he was welcome to pocket his profits, and to laugh, if he pleased, at the credulity of his customers. There was one indeed of these works, which could not be forgiven so easily. An intimation was thrown out in the preface, that it would be serviceable in the course of study recommended here for our degrees. Many people, as well as myself, were astonished at the

effrontery of this pretension. As for myself, I was too young when it first came out, to think of warning the world against it; and since that, the folly and inanity of the book have been exposed by a critic, whose only fault is, that he has passed over too lightly the offence of sporting with the credit of the University for the sake of private gain.

The author ought to have been thankful for this lenity: he ought to have felt the kind forbearance, which many others in this place, whose indignation was deep and well known, practised towards him. But, instead of taking this moderate correction and indulgence in good part, he has become hardened in folly—he has not ceased to weary the press with fresh absurdity, till there is no hope of silencing him by gentle means. Our patience has been tried to the uttermost already: the cup has been long full; and let him not wonder if this last drop has made the waters of bitterness to overflow.

If indeed he had confined himself to that class of writings, with which Oxford, as a place of education, is not concerned, we might have suffered them to pass in silence. I, at least, for one, should not have interrupted him in the enchanting occupation of rearing an accomplished female from the nursery, as I do not pretend to any knowledge or experience in those matters. I might perhaps have pitied the poor motherless Emily, who, without any fault of hers, and believing firmly her gallant father that the Porte was so called from its convenient harbour, should go and seek for Constantinople in the *broad and azure Hellespont*; who should expect to find Geneva and Lausanne on different lakes, and to see Glaciers towering over her head. All these mistakes might be inconvenient to a traveller; but as most well-educated females remain at home, no great harm would have been done to the world. But when an elementary book of in-

struction is studiously recommended to the young and unwary, containing errors

> Thick as autumnal leaves that strew the vales
> In Vallombrosa—

when every art of book-making chicanery is tried, by advertisement, by title-page and preface, to gain a lodgment for this fabric of imposture within our walls, can we be too loud or too forward in resisting such a design? At the captivating sound of things *made easy*, a crowd of half-witted, half-educated parents hail the welcome guest, and receive him to their bosoms. These we may despise, for they ought to know and have the means of knowing better; but the unsuspecting innocence of youth it is painful to see running eagerly to its own ruin; those

> Pueri innuptæque puellæ,

who naturally flock around, and join the cry,

> gaudentque manu contingere funem.

Can we then be blamed for endeavouring to weaken the authority, or to chastise the insolence of this false guide? Can we be wrong in hurling back upon himself that ignominy, in which he meant us all to be partakers? If he has done what he could to degrade us, can he complain if in our turn we make him an object of derision? For my own part, I feel more prone to anger than to laughter when employed in this task: but ridicule, though a weapon for the use of which man is deeply responsible, (and if ever I employ it against truth, or reason, or humanity, or religion, may my right hand forget her cunning,) yet is sometimes necessary in serious affairs, to keep alive the attention of the reader, and to refresh his spirits. We have a rough road to travel over, and I am afraid some of my younger comrades will lag behind, and drop off on the march, unless a merry

tune is now and then played; which, heaven knows, I shall play, if ever I do play, with a heavy heart, and that for the sake of my followers, not of myself.

The part indeed which merits the keenest severity will be dispatched first, although the justice of that treatment will depend upon what I establish in the sequel. Let us hear his own words in what he calls his Advertisement, a piece of base *charlatanerie*, deserving of a chastisement far beyond, both in kind and in degree, what it is in my power to inflict.

"The author of the following work was, during two "years, one of the Public Examiners in the University "of Oxford. He has endeavoured to derive from his "practice at that time, and from his previous and subse-"quent studies, whatever may be conducive to the eluci-"dation of that system of Logic, which he now submits "to the notice of the public."

What the wisdom of this appointment was it is now too late to enquire. The evil that arose from it is certainly incurable. But when one considers the serious hurt in his feelings, in his reputation, in his substantial interests, which a candidate may suffer who is rejected at his examination, one cannot but deeply lament that this power was ever vested in the hands of ignorance. There is indeed a fortunate security in the number of Examiners, which can never be less than three: for I am convinced, and am certain, as far as attendance on those occasions can make me certain, that no other Examiner was ever liable to the same objection; and therefore we may venture to hope that no such painful consequence ever followed from this appointment. But if the candidate had answered as he is taught in this book, I would not hesitate to affirm that he *ought* to have been rejected. How humiliating then, how pitiable the condition of a student under those circumstances!—questioned and teazed, and liable to be reproved, for having thoroughly learnt that

of which his Examiner was shamefully ignorant. Let us however dismiss the mortifying consideration. Only I trust it will be granted me, that, if the severe sentence of rejection be ever due to a candidate *compelled* to give an account of his studies, no severity can be too great for him who ought from his situation to be best informed, and who *voluntarily* challenges the notice of the public, provided I make good my charge against him.

That charge is, that in the book, which he calls *Logic made easy*, he betrays his ignorance in all the parts into which Logic is commonly divided.

First, Of the Logical distinctions of words.
Of the Predicables.
Of Subaltern Genera and Species.
Secondly, Of the component parts of a Proposition.
Of the meaning of the technical term *Distributed.*
Of the Opposition of Propositions.
Thirdly, Of the true meaning of *Syllogism.*
Of *Major* Term.
Of *Minor* Term.
Of Middle Term.
Of some fundamental rules of the Syllogism.
Of Perfect and Imperfect Moods.
Of Reduction.
Of Hypothetical Reasoning.

And besides this, that he has omitted many important rules; that he has omitted nearly all the reasons for the rules he delivers; that he frequently does not understand the reasons assigned by Aldrich; that he has repeatedly mistranslated him; that he has committed gross incidental blunders; that his language is often loose, confused, and incorrect, where it ought most to have been precise, clear, and exact; that the meaning of it is often obscure, and often that it has no meaning at all.

He confesses indeed that one of his chief difficulties

in acquiring Logic was, that the treatise he studied was written in *Latin*; a difficulty which it is evident still perplexes him. For (notwithstanding the subjoined list, from which he has the *sang froid* to say "he has extracted the *essence* of all that is practically useful to the "general student") his book, I affirm, is almost wholly taken from Aldrich, whose treatise he affects to call a *popular* compendium. If by *popular* is meant a close *condensation of all the leading principles of an art*, accompanied by a concise demonstration of them in an elliptical style, Aldrich's certainly is a *popular* treatise. But if by *popular* is meant the opposite of all this, then we can only acquit his veracity at the expence of his understanding, or his understanding at the expence of his veracity.

Whoever has digested well this *compendium* of Aldrich, whose chief characteristic is *pregnant brevity*, must have conceived some gratitude for his labours; and must, I should think, feel something of indignation at seeing this deceased author insulted by a kick from so unworthy a successor. That useful and plodding class of men too, college tutors, have no reason to thank him for insinuating that they are incompetent to the task of explaining the little technical difficulties, with which the art of Logic, like every other art, is accompanied. He might, I should conceive, (and it would have been no great sacrifice of his ambition,) have left this humble occupation to men who are content to do their duty in private, without telling the world all they do; who toil on in their plain working-dress, and envy not his flaunting finery, which ravishes the eyes and hearts of the good citizens of London. But so it was in Horace's time, and so it too often is now.

Optat ephippia bos piger, optat arare caballus.

Men will not know when they are well off. He might

have had the whole field of the metropolis to range at large in, and nobody here would, I believe, have attempted to spoil his feeding. But he shall not, if I can help it, fatten upon our disgrace: he shall not, if I can help it, with the British Critic for his mountebank, continue to vend his noxious salves and balsams, as if they were genuine *authorised* medicines. Let him have done with us, and we will have done with him.

One word more upon the list of books which have been consulted for *Logic made easy*, eighteen in number. If he had read and could understand the first of these, he need have gone no farther. The seventh would have been useful to him, as the best full compendium strictly Aristotelian, for from this Aldrich is principally abridged. It might have helped him also, as being Latin instead of Greek. The tenth, *Watts*, might have been of use, as being English instead of Latin. It has much valuable matter: but it is not advisable to enter upon it till the foundation has been well laid in Aristotle. As to the rest, except perhaps the thirteenth, it is all sheer *quackery*. I do not mean that the books are useless; but it is not the way to enrich or perfect Logic, by reading *several treatises of Logic*. The principles being once well settled, whoever seeks to explain and recommend them, must draw his materials from the whole range of art, of science, of literature, and philosophy. By the help of that commanding faculty, that *one-making* power, as Plato calls it, of the soul, men of genius may from time to time improve the best established systems; and no one surely would wish to check or to disparage this species of improvement. But I must be allowed to doubt whether the writer of *Logic made easy* was formed for carrying on this, one of the noblest processes of nature—whether his stomach is furnished with that *pancreatic juice*, which is able to reduce the heterogeneous mixture

gathered into it to one character, and extract from its various parts wholesome aliment, and new life for the body.

It is now time to enter upon a more particular enquiry. I will only premise, that personal hostility has no share in the present undertaking; that the author is attacked simply as an author; *and that this pamphlet does not contain a single phrase or word, from beginning to end, which would not have been applicable to any other man, who, under the same circumstances, had written the same works.* There will, I doubt not, be found reviewers enough to charge me with malice, and pique, and envy, and a long list of sins: but I firmly believe there will not be found even a British Critic hardy enough to say, that Mr. Kett is now attacked for having, in an *eminently useful book*, committed a *few mistakes* *.

Introductory Chapter. Sect. 1.

I have so much to do in the body of the work, that I shall not stop long here. It is a puerile declamation on the use of Logic, containing some nonsense, and some falsehood. E. g. p. 3. "By studying the *distinctions that pre-*
"*vail* with respect to propositions, he is *enabled to qua-*
"*lify his assertions*, and to measure them by the stand-
"ard of consistency." Nonsense. Again: "When he
"advances to that part of Logic which relates to sylloo-
"gistic reasoning, he *learns the agreement and disagree-*
"*ment of ideas* with each other." Ib. Falsehood. Other mistakes there are of little moment. For instance, that Logic puts us *on our guard against the language of error;* that "all Cicero's most celebrated Orations *are charac-*
"*terized* by the *copiousness* of his expressions, for the
"sake of conveying his ideas with *exactness*, and by the
"variety and *conclusiveness of his arguments*." P. 5.

* Vid. Brit. Crit. on Kett's Elements and Davison's Remarks.

Towards the end are four lines from a noble passage in Horace, Ep. ii. 2. 120. suitable, as Mr. Kett tells us, to those to whom they are suitable.

I know somebody, to whom two lines not far off are suitable.

> Prætulerim scriptor delirus inersque videri,
> Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant.

But enough of this. In

Section 2.

we have the History of Logic, in which Mr. K. abuses the Schoolmen very liberally: but for what? because, forsooth, they made "subtle and useless distinctions be- "tween *one word and another*," and that too as "*fancy* "suggested." Poor Bonaventura!

But there was a worse fault behind. "Their *bulky* "*volumes* filled every library, and exercised, or rather "fettered, the understanding of every student who aspired "*to distinction in the universities, or preferment in the* "*church*." At this passage is a reference in the margin to *Elements of General Knowledge*. Query. Was this finger-post put there by design, or accident?

Part I. Chap. I.

"The operations of the mind are three: 1. Simple "Apprehension; 2. Judgment; 3. Reasoning. The "first is *applied to the first part of Logic*." What, does Mr. K. seriously think that this operation of the *mind was made*, that he might have an opportunity of writing a treatise on Logic? I have heard of a projector, who thought the only use of rivers was to feed canals: but the narrowness of conception, in the present case, goes far beyond that celebrated example.

In p. 15. is a Pattern Syllogism, to illustrate the third operation of the mind. It is framed, I presume, on pur-

pose for the *Jubilee*, instead of a fire-work. I wish it had been stuffed with stronger powder—it would have gone off better. We will however take it as it is.

> *All good kings are beloved by their subjects:*
> *George the Third is a good king;* therefore
> *George the Third is beloved by his subjects.*

Which does he mean to prove? the *fact* that he is beloved, or the reason *why*? *An sit?* or *Cur sit?* If the former, it reminds me of a parallel instance, recorded in the following story.

A student, having been accidentally left by the Librarians of the Bodleian, when they shut up the Library, some time after discovered the condition he was in. Starting from his seat, he flew to the window, and called aloud for help. The only person near was the Keeper of the Schools, who answered him from below, proved to his satisfaction, in *Celarent*, that he was not there, and so left him. His argument was this:

> *No man is in the Bodleian Library after three o'clock:*
> *You are a man;* therefore
> *You are not in the Bodleian Library.*

Just so Mr. K.'s syllogism. If unfortunately the *fact* should ever be questioned, he must be a very good-natured disputant, who admits it upon the credit of this Middle Term.

But perhaps he meant only to assign the reason *why* he is beloved, supposing the *fact* to be acknowledged. In that case it is not a Syllogism at all, (which he certainly meant it to be,) as any Tiro may perceive. For the Conclusion in a Syllogism is that which *was* the Question. But here, "that George the Third is beloved by "his subjects," is not the Question. It is assumed as a fact, and an enquiry is instituted into the cause. *Why* George the Third is beloved by his subjects, is the Ques-

tion. This is not *syllogizing*, but *investigating*; a totally distinct process; and belongs not properly to Logic, but to the art or science in which the subject matter lies. The syllogistic form is not adapted to a proceeding, *where one term of the question is unknown*. This is one of the complaints which Lord Bacon makes against School Logic; and there is no answering it, except by saying, that an art must not be blamed for not teaching more than it professes to teach. The proper business of Logic is to make the agreement or the disagreement of two *given terms* more evident than it was before.

This purpose is not answered by Mr. K.'s Pattern Syllogism. I do not wonder at it. For I see clearly, that these speculations never passed through his mind; and that he has only been stringing together words and rules, of the force of which he had very confused notions. *His own purpose*, however, is answered too well: for, I take it, his arguments (like Peter Pindar's razors) are made not to cut, but to sell.

If this passage, long and dry as it is, serves to give the Student any firmer footing than he felt before, I may well be pardoned the digression. It will, I hope, be read with attention, notwithstanding the levity that introduced it.

In the mean time we must admire Mr. K. for his loyalty, whatever we may think of his Logic. And, considering the occasion for which this pseudo-syllogism seems to have been framed, and the hard doubling and tying with which its nonsense was fastened in, I think we may, after the example of some celebrated sophisms of old, as the *Achilles* of Zeno, the *Mentiens* of Chrysippus, not unaptly call this, the *Cracker* of Mr. Kett.

A remark immediately follows, to which the reader of *Logic made easy* has, I dare say, already given his firm assent—"Each of the operations of the mind is subject "to its respective defect."

Some few absurdities crown this chapter, of no great importance to the art or form of Logic. E. g. "Reflec- "tion is the *source of such acts* of the mind as *thinking*, "*hoping*, &c. *It consists in the action of the mind* upon "itself, &c." As an example of a *connate sentiment*, we have, I believe, for the first time, "Children ought to "honour their parents."

Chap. II.

P. 18. We are told, and told truly, that different words in different languages express the same idea: and, the writer remarks, it is evident from hence, that "for *that* "*reason* words are *said to be substituted* for things." As a detached sentence, he adds, that "words are said to be "*established by custom, because* the use of words is arbi- "trary;" that is, for the very convincing reason, because they are established by custom.

This, however, is the inference which ought to have been drawn from the first remark. He should have said, Different words in different languages express the same idea; from which it is evident, that they have no affinity in nature to *that* idea, but that they are established by custom to represent it. The general proposition, that *words are substituted* for things, or the ideas of things, needs no proof: it is an admitted fact. The whole passage is a muddy exposition of Aldrich. "Vox est signum "rei vel conceptûs ex instituto vicarium." To proceed.

"A univocal word has only one meaning, *agreeing* "*equally with many ideas*." No learner would understand this. It is a word which applies with equal propriety, and in the same sense, to many things: as *man*, to the several individuals of the species; *animal*, to the several individuals or species included under it.

"An *analogous* word is a word taken in *different senses*, "*and* one of them has some resemblance to *another*." This is proposed as an improvement upon the precise and ele-

gant definition of Aldrich. "Analogum est cujus *una* "*significatio inæqualiter* convenit multis." Inæqualiter—with unequal propriety—one use being primary, the other secondary—one proper, the other borrowed or metaphorical. This, which is the chief characteristic of analogous words, is wholly omitted by Mr. Kett. Because *analogy* is often used in common conversation where *resemblance* would do as well, he has run away with the notion, that they are the same thing. Analogy is not resemblance, but the *sameness or resemblance of relation.*

This topic is one of the richest which Logic contains. Mr. K. little suspects how much hidden treasure lies under it. But we must go on.

P. 20. Mæcenas, Alexander, and Cæsar, are given as examples of *Metaphor.*

"A *concrete* word signifies a *word connected with its* "*subject.*" Absolute nonsense. Could he possibly mean to render this passage of Aldrich? "*Concretum*, quod "*rem* [spectat] quasi suâ naturâ liberam, sed jam im-"plicitam subjecto, ut *Justus.*"

Take the following sentence as an explanation of *Relative Words.* It is the whole of his doctrine upon that subject.

"With respect to relative words, he may be a man, "who is neither the father nor the son, the master nor "the servant, of any particular man."

Lastly; as an example of *vox secundæ intentionis*, he gives "*organ*, when used to signify an instrument in "general." What sort of organ does he deserve?

Chap. III.

Hold up! I had nearly stumbled at the very threshold here: but surely it would not have been my fault, for I never could have expected Categories *or* Predicables side by side. An everlasting plague on our scavengers, if

they suffer these nuisances to remain undisturbed in the public road!

"Every Category or Predicable is a common term, "which may be asserted or predicated of things *of dif-*"*ferent kinds.*" Why only of *different* kinds? Is not *man* a predicable?

Let me observe here, for the sake of mere Tirones, that the ordinary way of speaking is not strictly accurate, when we say there are *five Predicables.* Aldrich's term is better, *Predicabilium capita.* Every *word* (except proper names, particles, and conjunctions) is a *Predicable* of one or other of the *five sorts, Genus, Species, Differentia, Proprium, Accidens.* So much to avoid being misunderstood: for I may often speak in the common way, and say there are but *five Predicables*, instead of *five sorts of Predicables.*

Mr. K. is very confused in what he says about the difference between a man and a horse, p. 25. Speaking of two characters of antiquity, Socrates and Bucephalus, he says, "This particular, in which *they* disagree, is called "the *differentia.* If *they* agree in any thing necessarily "connected with their essence, that is called the *propri-*"*um.*" If the first *they* and the last *they* stand for the same subject, this explanation is false. If the man and horse disagree in a part of their essence, that particular in which each disagrees from the other is well called its *differentia.* If the man and the horse *agree* in any thing necessarily connected with their essence, [which is impossible,] that particular is common to both, and therefore not the *proprium* of either. I suspect, that by the first *they* he meant man and horse—by the second *they*, *men only*, or *horses only.* Logic is a dry study, but you must bear with me. If I cannot make it *easy*, I try to make it entertaining. But if the above passage about the *proprium* stands, I may, for aught I know, be expected to provide entertainment both for man and horse.

P. 25. The example from Linnæus undoes all that had been said before about *Subaltern Genera and Species.* Both words are applicable to the same things, according as they relate to *cognate* classes more or less comprehensive than themselves. But what says this Logician?

" In Linnæus's arrangement, the animal kingdom is " the Summum Genus. The Six Classes are *the* Subaltern " *Genera.* The 354 kinds are *the Subaltern Species.* The " 6000 known species are the lowest species." I leave any Undergraduate who has passed the Responsiones to correct him. The same blunder is repeated in the same page, when speaking of the vegetable kingdom.

Chap. IV.

Definition.

The word *subaltern* genus is ignorantly used again, where he ought to have said the *proximum* genus, p. 28. As for the rules of Definition, they are tolerably translated from Aldrich, only that *justo numero* is rendered *exact number*, which is nonsense. It is a loose expression, and may be rendered *suitable, moderate.* It means in this passage neither too few nor too many.

But what shall we say of the Definitions themselves, proposed as patterns for young logicians?

" A Parallelogram is a four-sided figure, whose oppo- " site sides are equal, *and all its angles right angles.*" This a definition!

Perhaps he will quote in support of it *The Elements of General Knowledge;* in which case I must knock under, as I have only the authority of Euclid to oppose to him.

Let us take one more, as a specimen of English. " Geography is the science which describes the globe as " consisting of land and water, *and their* various inha- " bitants and productions." Try it how you will, I defy you to construe it.

Chap. V.

The Predicaments I pass hastily over, only observing, that there is not the slightest use in treating of them thus superficially. It will not do to go through *them* at a hand-gallop—they may be as well omitted altogether. In casting my eye over p. 33, I perceive, under the predicament of *Quantity,* that " triangles, squares, &c. are *affections* " of lines, surfaces, &c." Wallis would have told him, Mathematical figures *non sunt hujus loci. As figures* they belong to Quality, not to Quantity. They are *qualitates,* because they answer to the question *Quales,* but not *affections:* he might as well have said " moral tales."

Chap. VI.

The chapter on Division gives as a 3d rule, what is only an exemplification of the 2d. A pretty commentary this upon the art of Division!

PART II.

Chap. I.

The second part opens with a declaration of two awful truths:

Man is a rational animal.
A horse is not a rational animal.

The horse is a truly noble animal, and, considering the great services he renders mankind, I can hardly think it generous in us to be continually upbraiding him with that want of reason, to which he never put up any pretensions. Examples to be sure must be had somewhere; and my own tutor (who was a very dull man, but who was honest enough to learn what he took money to teach) always made his pupils scour the country in quest of them. To be sure, he kept the horse ready saddled in

the stable, for his own riding; but then it was only in case of need. If he had time, he used to put something before us a little more indicative of the faculty of reason in himself.

Still the propositions are both unquestionably *true*. The force of nature, however, could go no farther. The next is decidedly false.

"A Proposition consists of three parts or terms." Three terms in a Proposition!

"The subject and predicate of a Proposition *taken to-*
"*gether* are called the extremes." Why must they be *taken together?* Each of them is by itself called a *Term* or an *Extreme*, both names meaning the same thing.

"The subject is the term concerning which something
"is affirmed, denied, or *doubted*." OR DOUBTED! What have we to do here with doubting? Doubting is a state of the mind *previous to* any decision or judgment. A Proposition expresses an act of judgment *already performed*, or it is no proposition at all. You a teacher of Logic! You an Examiner! O shame! O shame!

Again. "The Copula is the *term* which connects the
"subject with the predicate." In the first lecture of the course which I attended, every fresh-man learnt enough to teach you better than this.

In the same page he turns *scribo* into *ego sum scribens*, and this he calls resolving a *word* into the ideas it contains. Any Student who has read Aldrich knows that it is merely resolving a *verb* into its component parts, the *Copula* and the *Participle*.

"From such examples it appears, that we are *not so*
"*much* to regard the number of words in a sentence, as
"the ideas they stand for." p. 42. Who, I should like to know, ever did? I beg pardon: I think the purchasers of Mr. K.'s works must be an exception from the general rule.

CHAP. II.

"A *particular* proposition *denotes* a *limited* number,
"and the signs prefixed are *some, many*." *Some* and *many* limited numbers! Perhaps this was only a slip of the pen. *Denotes*, however, is wrong. A proposition does not *denote*. A term denotes. He should have said, A particular proposition has for its subject a common term, but predicates only of a part of it; which part is expressed by some, many, &c.

But now comes the most extraordinary way I ever saw of making Logic easy. "An indefinite proposition in
"*necessary matter* is equal to a universal, *for* [instead of
"i. e.] it is understood to comprehend the whole sub-
"ject: it is equal to a particular proposition in *contingent*
"*matter, for* [instead of i. e.] it is understood to relate
"only to a part." p. 45. What *necessary matter* is, and what *contingent matter* is, the learner may wonder and examine, but he will never find till he comes to *p.* 51, where the explanation is translated from Aldrich. I say *for* is put instead of *i. e.* because *for* introduces a reason, and there is *no reason* given there. The reason for what is said does not come till p. 51.

Nothing is more necessary to a learner than a precise notion of what is meant by the technical term *Distributed*. What is Mr. Kett's definition?

"A term standing for the whole of a thing or subject,
"as it necessarily *includes all the parts* into which it can
"be divided, for that reason is said to be *distributed*."
Very confused and vague indeed. A term is said to be *distributed* in a proposition, when in that proposition it represents not any portion merely, but every individual of the things properly denoted by it.

Then follow the rules respecting the distribution of terms in the four Propositions, A. E. I. O. But these rules are to be taken upon trust, and learnt merely by

rote, according to Mr. K. for he does not offer a single demonstration of them, although he had only to translate one of the easiest pages, in point of Latin, of that *popular* compendium, to which he owes so much. There is certainly close reasoning in the page; which, I fear, is just as troublesome now, as Latin formerly was to the Examiner.

Chap. IV.

The same method is pursued in treating of the Conversion of Proposition. The rules are all taken from Aldrich, but the reasons of those rules are omitted; that being a *popular* treatise, and this, I suppose, truly esoteric.

The chapter, however, is very clumsily, not to say ignorantly, done. He says, there are *two sorts* of Conversion, and he gives us *three*. The last, viz. by contraposition, is omitted in Aldrich, as of little use. It is worthy of remark, however, as being the only method of converting a particular negative. Mr. K. has indeed given us the barbarous line,

ast O per contra, sic fit conversio tota,

in which he has betrayed, as usual, his ignorance of its meaning. It ought to have been either *A, O per contra*, &c. or, as it commonly runs, *fAxO per contra*, &c. to shew that A and O are capable of this sort of conversion. He has left out A in his line, and yet the only examples he gives are of that proposition; not one of O. This comes from what has been heretofore aptly called "the "unhappiness of compilation."

For my own part, I like old Wallis's English lines best.

E, I are *simply* turned: E, A by Acc.
A, O are *counter-put*, in going back.

The last paragraph of this chapter, treating of *convertible terms*, has no business here. Its substance is taken from Wallis, who expressly says, that the doctrine of *convertible terms* is quite foreign to this part, [*non est hujus loci,*] but belongs (as must be obvious to any reflecting mind) to the first part of Logic. This also comes from the "unhappiness of compilation." We shall soon see that Mr. K. uses even the words Term and Proposition as *convertible terms*.

Chap. V.

Opposition of Propositions.

Opposition, he says, takes place "when two propo-"sitions having the same extremes differ *either in quan-"tity*, or in quality, or in both." And yet in the same page he tells us, that disagreement in *quality* is essential to Opposition, properly so called.

"In subaltern propositions, a false particular follows "a false universal." p. 51. Thus for example:

"*All men are generous*," is certainly a false universal; therefore, according to Mr. K. "*Some men are gene-"rous*," is false likewise. Well done Examiner!

In his examples of impossible matter, that is, where the extremes essentially disagree, he cleverly pronounces their agreement, as, *All men are angels*.

PART III.

Chap. I.

Argument and Syllogism.

"*Reasoning* is that kind of *evidence*, by which one truth "is inferred from others by just methods of argu-"ment." p. 57. Then follow two specimens of reasoning, both of them *Petitiones principii*; i. e. proving a question *per æque ignotum*, or rather *per ignotius*. Here is the first of them. The other is just like it.

All houses are built by men:
All cottages are houses; therefore
All cottages are built by men.

His own account of *Petitio principii*, p. 84. is not a bad one. "This takes place when an *attempt* is made to prove "a Proposition by the same Proposition in other words, "or by some reason that is equally uncertain and dis- "puted." He seems, however, to think it a *commendable and ingenious attempt*, for he is perpetually at it, when he would give examples of Reasoning. Otherwise, how unaccountable this infatuation, with the sentence just quoted staring him in the face! But truly doth Fuller inform us, A wink is as good as a nod to some people. There is a dulness which can see nothing, which can be taught nothing. *Query.* Can it be made to feel? I almost despair even of that, since the ill success of Mr. Davison's Remarks.

THEREFORE, *All cottages are built by men!*

Mr. K. after having used this proposition in the preceding paragraph as an example of one which stands in no need of proof, is not ashamed to print this trash, and call it a Syllogism. How much better are the general signs, A, B, C, than such examples!

"The *Major term* [of a syllogism] is the Predicate." The predicate of what? "The *Minor term* is the *Sub-* "*ject.*" Again I must ask, but ask in vain, The subject of what?

The *Major term* is afterwards used to explain the *Major premiss*, and the *Minor term* to explain the *Minor premiss*, although neither *Major* nor *Minor* term have been explained themselves. Presently, however, he tells us, "The "Major term of a Syllogism is *therefore* the predi- "cate of the conclusion." Therefore! For what? The whole is inextricable confusion. It may do Mr. K. no

harm. But if a canditate were to give this account of things in the Schools, he would infallibly be *plucked.*

Five out of the six principles, upon which syllogistic reasoning is founded, are translated from Aldrich; but why not the sixth? Was it because he could not? It is just as necessary to be mentioned as the fifth, being applicable to *Negatives*, as that is to *Affirmatives.*

Then follows a part, which I know not how to describe by its proper title. It strikes me as the most impudent and scandalous pretence of *making Logic easy*, that ever was put forth since the art of puffing was invented. Aldrich gives twelve fundamental rules for the structure of the syllogism, with accurate demonstrations of them, by help of principles previously established. His whole section is a beautiful specimen of brevity, perspicuity, and correctness. Mr. K. also gives twelve rules. The first, second, third, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth, are taken from Aldrich; omitting all the reasons on which they rest: just as if one were to string together the forty-eight Propositions of the first book of Euclid without the Demonstrations, and then call it making *Mathematics easy.* The fourth rule is not from Aldrich: nor, indeed, should I ever have suspected it of coming from a rational animal. It runs thus:

"That syllogism is faulty, in which the Middle term "is not distributed in the premisses, but is distributed "in the conclusion." The Middle term in the conclusion!!! How very easy Logic is now made! Oh! Mr. Kett! Mr. Kett! does not the phantom of some rejected candidate haunt your midnight dreams, and cry aloud for vengeance! That *you* should be sitting with your cap on as an Examiner, while *he* stood trembling before you, and awaiting your sentence! Oh! the blindness, the wanton cruelty of Fortune!

The eleventh rule is one of his own too. "If either

" of the premisses be false, so will be the conclusion." Thus, to use the favourite example,

cAm. *Every horse is an animal:*
Es. *No man is an animal*; therefore
trEs. *No man is a horse.*

I suppose Mr. Kett will allow the Minor premiss to be false. But then, according to his own rule, the Conclusion must be false likewise. Therefore its Contradictory must be true. Therefore " *Some man is a horse.*" How degrading are his rules to his own species!

The twelfth rule is no rule. It tells us nothing. Perhaps he meant by it to express the sixth of Aldrich, a very important one; and therefore, as was natural, omitted, in order to make Logic easy.

Chap. II.

" The *various manners*, in which the terms of *any* three " propositions may be stated, in order to make syllo- " gisms, *are determined by the different figures.*" I leave this to speak for itself.

P. 63. " It is evident from the rules of syllogistic rea- " soning before stated, that no other forms are conclu- " sive, except such as are marked out by the following " ternaries, &c." *It is evident!* If it is, you have done all you could to make it *not evident*. For you have not given the *demonstration* of a single rule; you have not given the *application* of a single rule; you have not shewn why some legitimate Moods are excluded from each figure; and, by omitting Aldrich's sixth rule, you have left the list open to fifteen additional Moods, which are excluded only by the operation of that rule. So much for your knowledge of *Mood* and *Figure*.

Disdaining the A, B, C of Aldrich, Mr. K. will give us syllogisms of his own invention. But they are mostly

of the Cracker kind: i.e. the Conclusion is a proof of the Minor premiss, not the Minor premiss of the Conclusion. In other words, the connection between the Middle term and one of the Extremes is less evident than the connection between the Extremes themselves.

No passionate man is judicious:
Every philosopher is judicious; therefore
No philosopher is a passionate man.

Again:

All frauds are forbidden by law:
Some trades are not forbidden by law; therefore
Some trades are not frauds.

Would not a rational animal rather infer, that a philosopher was judicious, because he was not passionate; and that some trades were not forbidden by law, because they are not frauds?

Chap. III.

The Reduction of Syllogisms.

" The first figure is *therefore called direct* or perfect, be- " cause *all kinds of syllogisms may be proved* in it." Most of you to whom I address myself know this sentence, like many others, to be made up of *falsehood* and *nonsense*. First, The Moods of the first figure are not called direct or perfect for the reason here assigned, but because they are demonstrable by the *Dictum de omni et nullo*. Secondly, To talk of *syllogisms proved* in a certain Mood is to talk *nonsense*. *Propositions* may be proved.

He continues: " In its four Modes *the conclusions ne-* " *cessarily follow from the premisses*; but the Modes in all " the other figures are deficient *in some particulars*; there-

" fore they are called indirect, or imperfect." This is not nonsense, but it is wholly false. The conclusions in *all* the Moods necessarily follow from the premisses: the only inferiority in the Moods of the second and third figure is, that their conclusiveness is *less evident:* it is not capable of being demonstrated by the *Dictum de omni et nullo.* For that purpose, and for no other, Reduction is of use.

No wonder that a writer, who knows not the *use* of Reduction, should be unable to explain its process. The two paragraphs about *Reductio ad Impossibile* are admirable specimens, in the way of Quintilian's declaiming master, σκότισον, σκότισον. The latter is deeply charged with nonsense. I would advise the young student not to venture near it.

In p. 69. *Cesare* is said to be reduced to *Celarent* " by " the simple conversion of the Major *term.*" Some time ago he used *Syllogism,* where he ought to have used *Proposition*; now, in the place of *Proposition,* he uses *Term.* Is it possible that such an one can know the meaning of either? But I am sick of all this. Reduction is the most useless part of School Logic: and, I presume, it is only made, if ever it is made, the subject of enquiry at our Examination, as the most expeditious method of ascertaining that the candidate has really studied a treatise of Logic in the regular manner.

Chap. IV.

Hypothetical Syllogisms.

Crackers again!

If the king be wise, the people are well governed:
But the king is wise; therefore
The people are well governed.

Most loyal and convincing! I hope the people are as much satisfied of the Consequent, as I am of the Antecedent. My only means, however, as I am not a courtier, of judging this Antecedent to be true, are by deducing it from the Consequent: a proceeding with which all Mr. Kett's readers are, I believe, by this time perfectly familiar.

N. B. An admirable example of this same kind may be seen, p. 71. which I omitted in its proper place:

All believers in Christ will be saved:
Some Jews will not be saved; THEREFORE
Some Jews are not believers in Christ.

P. 73. I must copy the whole of this paragraph. "To " remove the Antecedent or Consequent in such cases, " [i. e. Destructive Hypothetical reasoning,] does not " merely signify the denial, but the contradiction of it; " for the denial of it, by a contrary Proposition, *will not* " *make a true Syllogism*; as for example,

" *If every man be good, then every gamester is good:*
" *But no gamester is good*; therefore
" *No man is good.*"

Who but Mr. K. would have *attempted* to draw that inference? I affirm, notwithstanding his high authority, that we may remove the Antecedent by *denying* the Consequent, as much as by contradicting it. Indeed, I do not know any writer who uses these words as different in meaning. To adduce a Contrary Proposition is to do more than to *deny*; it is to disallow the statement of the adversary, and to advance one of your own. E. g.

All writers on Logic will be read with profit.

I *deny* that.

Some writers on Logic will not be read with profit.

But if I say,

No writer on Logic will be read with profit,

I enter upon a new question. This, however, may be thought trifling—too obvious to require explanation. For every one surely sees, that the regular inference may be drawn in Mr. K.'s example from the premisses there stated, viz. "*Every man is not good:*" which is equivalent to "*Some men are not good.*" I have proved the falsehood of the Antecedent by deducing its Contradictory.

Chap. V.

Of Compound and Defective Syllogisms.

Speaking of an Enthymem, he is bold enough to give the following example:

Rashness is a vice; therefore
Rashness is to be avoided.

and then adds, "If we supply, *Every vice is to be* "*avoided,* as a Major *term,* the syllogism will be com- "plete." He is nearly come to the end of his treatise, and has not yet learned the difference between *term* and *proposition.*

I have only to repeat to him, in the language of good Sir Hugh Evans, "That divers philosophers hold the "*term* to be parcel of the *proposition,*" not one and the self-same thing.

It is indeed unlucky for Mr. K. that, besides having "all the operations of the mind liable to their respective "defects," he has not what Sir Hugh would call "a "good sprag memory," he can "remember nothing in "his prain." I would be content to let him off all the three *operations,* if he minded what was told him a little better, or minded only what he had said himself. Without one or other of these faculties, however, the writing of books does seem to me a species of *rashness,* and

therefore, according to his own irresistible enthymem, *to be avoided.* It was but a few pages back, p. 41. that he told us a Proposition consisted of *three terms,* whereas now he allows it only *one!* But I have learned something by this puzzle. I never knew, till now, the exact meaning of a Term-trotter—a species of animal, which had of late become so scarce, as to be considered almost extinct. We used to fancy him, *animal bipes implume,* νῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικὸν, otherwise he would not have travelled so far for what he could not carry home. But in future, I believe, he must resign his title to most of these properties: of one I am sure I am at this moment depriving him; for whatever may be thought hereafter of his science and his νῦς, his *Logic made easy* will certainly never cease to be *a feather in his cap.*

A truce, however, to this trifling. The honest Cambrian above mentioned was an Examiner as well as Mr. Kett; and I once had a design of sketching out a scene, compiled from *Logic made easy,* and a few other documents of equal authority, by which the University might have brought the two rivals into comparison, each in their respective line; Sir Hugh in Grammar, and Mr. K. in Logic. But my remarks have run out to such length already, that I must abandon this project, and leave it to the hands of some saucy Undergraduate, who, I doubt not, will catch the hint, and dress it up with much better seasoning than I could prepare myself.

I will only observe of this simple-hearted devourer of toasted cheese, that, however meanly he might execute the task of educating his hopeful pupil, he does not make a parade of his services, and call upon the world to admire him: and when desired to inflict a little discipline on a vain-boaster and a bully, he seems to think with reason, that "it is admirable pleasures, and fery "honest knaveries."

But we have not quite done with the Enthymem yet. For an enthymematic sentence, he lets out the old hack.

Ἀθάνατον ὀργὴν μὴ φυλάττε θνητὸς ὤν.

But his translation omits the only word which makes it enthymematic, ὤν.

O mortal, cherish not immortal rage.

Why was he above following that popular book, which translates it for him, " *Mortalis cùm sis?* "

Then follow some remarks, which every one will allow to be acute and original.

" If an Euthymem be false, it is so because one of the " premisses is false, or because the *conclusion is not cor-* " *rect*: as if any one should argue thus:

" *Man is an animal*; therefore
" *A man can fly.*

" Here the Consequent cannot follow from the Ante- " cedent, unless it was granted that *all animals can fly.*

" The Enthymem forms the most common kind of ar- " gument both in writing and in conversation; therefore " attention *to correctness in the application of it* is highly " necessary." p. 78.

Does he mean to say, that there are two distinct causes for the falsehood of Enthymems? If so, he has given no example of the latter, which most required it. But what is meant by a *false Enthymem?* By a *false Syllogism,* we mean an inconclusive one; not one which contains a *false premiss.* The same, one would think, would hold of a *false Enthymem.* But there is in fact no such thing as an *inconclusive* Enthymem: because one premiss being suppressed, it may always be considered as that proposition which is necessary to warrant the conclusion. Therefore I cannot well see what a *false Enthymem* means. Mr. K. however talks of the *conclusion not being correct,* as a cause why an *Enthymem is false.* He seems to have no distinct idea annexed to any one word of the sentence. Yet he tells us, that Logic serves to " dissipate the clouds of confusion, and to introduce the " light of order into the mind: it teaches men to make " just distinctions between the various kinds of words " and ideas," &c. &c. I wish he would accompany his advertisements with an authentic list of cures. For my own part, I generally feel more confusion, more uncertainty and embarrasment, after reading his attempt to explain a thing, than I did before. Thus, in the sentence above quoted, I suppose his meaning, if any, is this: If the *Enthymem is not correct,* the *conclusion is false;* not *that the Enthymem is false because the conclusion is not correct;* which seems to me to be either saying what is not true, or what has no meaning. For *true* and *false* belong properly to single *Propositions.* Combinations of Propositions are *correct* or *not correct.*

Now I am upon this subject, let me notice another passage in a different part of his book, where the same confusion prevails; pardonable indeed in a boy, but disgraceful in a man, who professes to dissipate the clouds of confusion by the aid of Logic. He is speaking of Mathematicians. " They state *Postulates,* the *truth* of " which, when once admitted, cannot afterwards be dis- " puted." p. 91. And in the same page again he speaks of " *Propositions deduced from Postulates.*"

Now this shews that he is ignorant what a Proposition is. A Proposition *affirms* or *denies.* A Postulate *begs, asks, requires.* A Proposition *must be* either true or false. A Postulate *can never be either.* The one is addressed to our *understanding,* the other to our *will.* We *assent* to the one, we *consent* to the other. Yet, because some colloquial words are applied equally to each, such as *granting, admitting, rejecting, denying, fair, just, reasonable,*

&c. people are apt to confound the matter still more, and transfer to the one, words which denote ideas proper *only* to the other.

The importance of fixing these elementary notions steadily and distinctly in the mind is incalculable. Mr. Kett (whom I eagerly quote when he happens to be right) truly says, "it is the first step to accurate know-"ledge." How unlucky then that he should think of teaching Logic before he had taken that step himself! The importance, I say, is incalculable. For these ideas being clearly discerned, serve as standards, by which a whole army is marshalled and arrayed; and, if ever the thoughts are thrown into confusion, become rallying points, round which the scattered forces collect gradually, and fall into their proper places. Thousands of secondary and compound ideas, each with their corresponding terms, depend upon one common primary idea, to which they all bear a certain affinity or relation. In some, this primary idea is the base of their composition; in others it is a principal; in others a subordinate ingredient. Still it is a central point of action to all, and the movements of these subordinate parties must be regulated by the situation of their superior. Those most essentially connected with it should be most rigidly confined. In proportion as they recede from the centre, more freedom is allowed, till at length the light troops, upon whom no stress is laid, may be allowed to range loosely about, to intermix with one another, and to scour the distant country.

During a period of peace, indeed, a certain laxity of discipline is allowed to all. But at the sound of the trumpet, at the sight of an enemy, the moment close reasoning and argument are intended, we must call in these stragglers, and employ them in their peculiar office and duty.

Thus, in the instance before mentioned, we talk of *true*

men, true syllogisms, true lines, true appearance, true representation; to all of which cases, of course, *false* may be opposed: but if we consider attentively, the word denotes different ideas in each instance; e. g. *honest men, legitimate syllogisms, perfect lines, real appearance, exact representation*, the genuine idea of *truth* not belonging properly to any. And language, having a natural tendency towards this rambling, how necessary is it, to prevent surprise, that we should know beforehand both the right quarters of our men, and the favourite haunts into which they are apt to stray! The first of these points of information Logic gives, especially in the part called the Categories, or Predicaments, and the Post-predicaments; a very valuable part of the Organon, where the most fundamental and continually recurring ideas, vaguely as they are conceived in common life, have their exact limits marked out, and the latitude of action, which must be allowed even in the strictest service, carefully prescribed.

The doctrine is so important and so interesting, that I may be allowed perhaps to illustrate it by another image. It is with *words* as with *money*. Those who know the value of it best, are not therefore the least liberal. We may *lend* readily and largely; and although this be done quietly, and without ostentation, yet there is no harm in keeping an exact account in our private memorandum-book of the sums, the persons, and the occasions on which they were lent. It may be, we shall want them again for our own use; or they may be employed by the borrower for a wrong purpose; or they may have been so long in his possession, that he begins to look upon them as his own. In either of which cases it is allowable, and even right, to call them in. This can be understood, however, only of considerable sums, such as may draw after them some weighty consequences, according as they

are well or ill applied. Our loose cash we may dispose of, as others do, without calling ourselves or others to a serious account; though even here, perhaps, a little discretion will not be found amiss.

If the analogy is perceived and allowed, no one will wonder why I recommend the study of the Categories (including the Post-predicaments) as a most salutary discipline of the mind. Indeed, I am persuaded, that a thorough acquaintance with the meaning of ten words of the kind there discussed will inform and improve its faculties more than ten volumes upon General Knowledge, after the manner of Mr. Kett, even putting the errors of every sort out of the question.

Neither should this study be considered as extinguishing, or even restraining, the power of the imagination. On the contrary, I am convinced, it will tend to invigorate its flights, and will enable it in its wildest excursions to grasp its prey more firmly: while to the more calm and methodical enquirer it will serve to unlock some of the golden stores of taste; and to the gifted few, who are content to toil up the arduous steep, it will point the way towards that proud eminence, those *sapientûm templa serena*, from whence will burst upon their view delightful and glowing visions of philosophy.

The subject is too captivating. I must now break from it, and resume a drudgery of which I am almost weary.

Before we quit the passage last produced from p. 78, let me observe, that the word *Conclusion* is used by Mr. K. in the sense of *consequens*, not *consequentia*, as may be seen by a reference to p. 77. so that he cannot escape any part of my remarks by accusing me of having put a wrong sense upon the word. Indeed, if it were meant to bear the sense of *consequentia*, his doctrine would only

amount to this, "that the Enthymem is incorrect when its reasoning is incorrect;" by which explanation he would not gain much.

Once for all of Enthymems of three terms. They are then only faulty when the *premiss understood* is more questionable than the *premiss expressed*, or than the *conclusion*. As if I should say,

All believers in Christ will be saved: therefore
Some Jews are not believers in Christ.

The absurdity of the reasoning is made manifest by putting forward the latent premiss, which will not bear the light. Nobody, at least, but Mr. Kett would be hardy enough to advance the following as a process of reasoning:

All believers in Christ will be saved:
Some Jews will not be saved; therefore
Some Jews are not believers in Christ.

Vid. *Logic made easy*, p. 71.

Induction.

Induction is a process which required particular explanation: for a vulgar opinion prevails, that Lord Bacon first introduced this method of reasoning, and that it supersedes the use of the Aristotelic Syllogism. Induction is certainly the method by which Principles are to be acquired, which Aristotle knew, and said as distinctly as Lord Bacon. Aristotle's fault is, that he assumed his principles too hastily; and the folly of the Schoolmen was their supposing, that what he *assumed* as principles, they must implicitly receive. Hence, in Physics especially, the progress of science was hindered, if not altogether stopped. The professed object of enquirers in that study was to reconcile the phænomena of nature with some previously received dogma, the truth of which it was a kind of philosophical heresy to question. And

thus the speculations of the most ingenious men served rather to bind the error, if it was an error, faster upon mankind, and to wind it round with more subtle and intricate threads of perplexed reasoning. Just as when a physician, having mistaken a case, brings to the treatment of it some false preconceived notion, and endeavours to twist every thing into a conformity with his own first opinion, matters go on much worse than if the patient had been left alone to the suggestions of common sense and of his own feelings. Sometimes, indeed, nature would break through these bandages of ignorance, and do her own work. Of this we have some noble examples, in the first Bacon, in Copernicus, and a few others.

No one, however, till the immortal author of the Novum Organon, ventured to renounce his allegiance altogether to this unconstitutional and usurped authority. He planned an entire revolution in the whole fabric and economy of the state. He may be regarded as the inheritor of some antiquated mansion, upon which, from its first building, its successive owners had neither made nor attempted any improvement; but had only sought, by temporary expedients, to keep it weather-tight, and hand it down as little altered as they could to their next descendants. Despising the ignoble work of patching, propping, and plaistering over, He determined upon a vigorous and decisive measure. He was unwilling to trust the interested and prejudiced surveyors of the old school; and accordingly he made a thorough inspection of the state of the building, from top to bottom, himself: when, finding the foundation unsound, the main beams ill laid, the timbers rotten, the roof falling in, the apartments and passages aukwardly contrived and inconvenient, he made up his mind at once to pull the whole to pieces, and to begin, as well as he was able, a

new edifice from the ground. He had laid in a large stock of materials himself, before he made known his chief design. He then redoubled his diligence, and, pointing out the likeliest places, and the best way of searching, he called upon his friends to help him in bringing together what he wanted.

Still, for a time, the family were worse lodged than before. Temporary sheds were run up, which did not stand the first winter. Many people made heavy complaints of his want of reverence for antiquity, and for the judgment of those who had gone before him. "The old house was good enough for his ancestors; and "why could not he remain contented with it?" Some laughed at his temerity, and exulted in any little failure of his new undertaking; others shook their heads, and predicted that no good would come of it to the neighbourhood round. Many were seen, especially the pensioners and hangers-on of the old family, raking still among the ruins for little scraps and fragments of worn-out materials, which they fancied must be better than any that could be made now-a-days. Some were even so infatuated, that they preferred boarding up for themselves, among the tottering ruins, a frail, leaky outhouse to lodge in, that they might shew their contempt of the new-fangled habitations he was preparing for their use.

This state of things, however, did not last long. The new materials were found in general so much superior to the old, that common sense forced people into an approbation and preference of them. The builders employed grew every day more expert in their business: hands came in fast; and the work went on briskly. In the mean time the illustrious owner and master-workman died, leaving his unfinished work a legacy to his friends and countrymen. They were not insensible to its value, and in general acted upon the plan he had

sketched out for them. Nevertheless, it was not till the time of the great Newton that we could be said to have a house to live in. It was then that all the main parts of the building might be considered as put out of hand; though much remains now to be done, inside and out, upstairs and down, and we are still *in mortar*.

Now, lest any of you should suppose that I have forgotten what I was about, (and in truth this building has been a longer job than I intended or expected myself,) let us consider whether the view thus taken may not help to correct some vulgar prejudices. Those among you who are at all acquainted with Lord Bacon's works, and with the progress of philosophy in this country during the seventeenth century, will not be at a loss to find some meaning in every sentence of my prolix story.

The principal meaning, however, is this. That both Aristotle and Bacon laboured in the same cause; and mankind make the same use now of the labours of the latter, which they heretofore did of the former. They reason *from* the principles which he, and those who followed in his school, established. If any dispute occurs in physics, it is considered at once settled, when either party traces his doctrine to one of these first principles. The law of Gravitation, the laws of Optics and of Hydrostatics, are as much the *dogmas* of the modern school, as any of the most exploded errors of the ancients were of theirs. *That nature*, for instance, *abhors a vacuum. That nothing is heavy in its own place.* And although we boast of our emancipation from all arbitrary authority; yet, I believe, in practice it would be found, that no man's reasoning would now be listened to, which was inconsistent with those principles. He would be laughed at as a simpleton, or shunned as a heretic. Do not, however, mistake me. The new system is undoubtedly, in every respect, a better built edifice; and it would

be folly to compare it in grandeur, in solidity, in convenience, with that which it has superseded. It will bear looking into in all its parts. It is, moreover, so contrived, as to be capable of boundless enlargement and improvement. And the inhabitants feel it worth their while to employ all their capital in completing, in supporting, in furnishing, and adorning it.

So much for the INDUCTION of Modern Philosophy, as contrasted with that of Aristotle. I do not hesitate to join with those who call the one hasty, scanty, and unsatisfactory; the other cautious, full, and convincing. The merit of sagacity, however, I cannot confine to the moderns. Considering the means he had, Aristotle seems to me to have outdone them.

And so much also for the confused notion, that *Induction* has superseded the use of *Syllogism*, or that they at all enter into competition with each other. (Vid. p. 12. of this Pamphlet.)

The method, indeed, of *Induction* itself may be considered as a syllogistic act of the mind, in which the general principle elicited forms the *Conclusion*. The *Minor premiss* states, that a certain property belongs to a number of individuals, which have been examined; and the *Major premiss* (which is latent, and always the same, whatever subject we may be employed about) declares, that whatever property belongs to these individuals, belongs to the whole class of which they are members. Nothing can be more terse or perspicuous than Aldrich's account of it. "In quâ ponitur quantum opus est de "singulis, et deindè assumitur de universis." I do not like his mode of resolving it into a Syllogism. I think the mode above stated much simpler and clearer.

Now the jut of the question, in *reasoning* by Induction, always lies in the Major premiss. And the imperfection of this method is, that no rule can be given *how many*

individuals we must examine, before we are authorized to consider them as equivalent to the whole class. *Quantum opus est* is vague and indefinite. Hence the Conclusions in Experimental Philosophy are never absolutely certain; at least no line can be drawn, within which we can say the number of experiments is not sufficient, and beyond which the number is sufficient to warrant the Conclusion. A process of that kind may be considered, however, as a sound *Topical Syllogism*; the Conclusion always possessing the same degree of probability which the Major premiss had. Further investigation may lead us to discover the falsehood of that Major premiss, and then, of course, the Conclusion must be abandoned.

There is, however, a species of Induction, which is called *Perfect*, in opposition to the other, which is called *Imperfect*. In *Perfect* Induction the Minor premiss enumerates *every individual* of the class under consideration. Of course the Major premiss cannot be disputed, and the Conclusion is not *probable* only, but *certain*. The Syllogism, in that case, is *Demonstrative*, and is treated of accurately in his latter *Analytics*. This method, however, can rarely be employed. If the class of which we are speaking is a natural species, it is impossible, for their number is unlimited. It may be practised with classes whose numbers are limited, as the planets, the quarters of the globe, the seasons, &c. It is then tedious in form. For if the Minor premiss be established, to state the Major premiss and the Conclusion would be superfluous.

What INDUCTION is in all other subjects of reasoning, that EXAMPLE is in human conduct. It is common to treat the two heads as distinct. They are, in fact, the same process; but the Example is less conclusive, because human conduct is less subject than other things to fixed

laws. Hence the Major premiss is more questionable, but the form of reasoning is the same. As good a specimen as any is given Arist. Rhet. i. c. ii. §. 7.

All who demand a body-guard meditate tyranny:
Dionysius demands a body-guard; therefore
Dionysius meditates tyranny.

If the Major premiss is disputed, we must support it by **Induction of particulars*; as, Pisistratus, Theagenes, &c.

Thus diffuse have I been, in order that you may judge how stupidly and confusedly Mr. K. has managed this part. He says, "Induction pursues two different methods; 1. by advancing from particular instances to a "general conclusion; 2. from parts to the whole." They are, in fact, both the same. The only differences that can be established in the methods of Induction are those above pointed out, viz. *Perfect* or *Imperfect*, according to the number of parts specified; *Induction* or *Example*, according to the subject-matter of the reasoning.

Hence too may be perceived why reasoning by Induction is sometimes called reasoning by Analogy. For Analogy is the resemblance or the sameness of *ratios*. Thus,

A : B : : C : D

If that proportion be allowed, whatever Relation can be shewn to subsist between A and B, the same may be concluded of C and D. The same Relation may also be concluded of the equal multiples or the equal parts of these quantities. But if we depart from the Category of Quantity, the application of this reasoning becomes less con-

* Such is the proper meaning of the word Induction. Mr. K. I see uses it incorrectly; e. g. "Induction *from* particular instances to a general con-"clusion." This error is pardonable, for it is of no great importance, and he has many to keep him in countenance.

clusive; at least the establishment of the *Proportion*, which is the *Major premiss*, is more difficult. For there may be *one point or several points of Relation* between A and B, the same *with one or several* between C and D. But this will not authorize us to infer that *all* their points of Relation are the same.

Let us try the case above given under EXAMPLE.

Pisistratus : Athens : : Dionysius : Syracuse

The Relation in which they are *known* to agree is, that they each demand of their citizens a body-guard. From this Relation is inferred the *unknown term*, that each does it with the same motive, to establish a tyranny.

No one, when reasoning in morals, is supposed to lay down his Major premiss as strictly universal; or to affirm, that the Proportion is absolute, extending to a similarity in all possible Relations between the respective terms. But we do affirm, when reasoning by Analogy, that the similarity of one or several Relations being known to exist, is a *presumption* or *proof* of the similarity of others yet unknown. And hence, as in the case of Induction, if our Major premiss is disputed, we must support it by enumeration of particulars; that is, by shewing several instances in which the *known Relation* and the *unknown Relation co-exist*; whence we infer the probability, that they are united always.

But I must be cautious how I enter upon this wide field—a field in which I could long expatiate with pleasure, were it suitable to my present purpose, and not likely to repel instead of attracting readers. Let me conclude, therefore, this part with observing, that the writer of *Logic made easy* has omitted to state that which constitutes the chief boast of Aristotelian Logic, namely, that all these methods of reasoning, by whatever name they go,

Enthymem, Sorites, Induction, Analogy, Example, or under whatever disguise of language they may pass, *Hypothetical, Disjunctive, Causal*, &c. are resolvable into the form of the PURE CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISM. When reduced to this form, their validity is tried by the rules already laid down for MOOD and FIGURE. In one or other of these *Moods* the reasoning, if sound, must find a place. If it be in any of the IMPERFECT MOODS, it may be *reduced* to a PERFECT MOOD. And the validity of the *Perfect Moods* is demonstrable by the immediate application of the "DICTUM DE OMNI ET NULLO;" which *Dictum*, therefore, is the *Nucleus* of the whole system.

CHAP. VI.

Sophisms or Fallacies.

Before the time of Aristotle, there was no complete system of Formal Logic, by which the vanities of the Sophists might be convicted and exposed in a summary way. The irregular modes of speaking, continually practised in common conversation, served as a thicket and cover, to which they could easily betake themselves, and baffle all the sagacity of their pursuers. The phraseology in which they expressed their meaning, was sanctioned by the idiom of their language and by general use. Why then, they might say, should they be driven from that mode of speaking, and be made to adopt one comparatively dry, formal, and jejune?

Thus, while they kept to their own way of stating things, the silly were captivated, the stupid were confounded, the wise were often obliged to retire, incapable of exposing them to the contempt they deserved, and to rest satisfied with the consciousness that they possessed

the truth themselves, although they could not succeed in detecting and exterminating the falsehood of others.

It is to Aristotle we owe that *system of arranging words*, by which all possible assertions may be made, and yet made in such a way, that, if any flaw exist in the connection of those assertions, it must become apparent to common sense. *The Pure Categorical Syllogism is that test which no false reasoning can stand.*

And yet this very form is sometimes employed for the purpose of concealing that fraud which it was meant to render impracticable. And truly it *does* render it impracticable, if the laws of the Syllogism be well understood, and rigidly enforced.

The fundamental rule, against which all fallacies of language offend, is, that *the Syllogism must invariably consist of three Terms only, and of three Propositions only.* If any ambiguity exist in one of the Terms, or in the construction of one of the Propositions, that Term is really not *one* Term, but *two* Terms; that Proposition is really not *one* Proposition, but *two* Propositions: and, consequently, the Syllogism having four Terms or four Propositions is *apparent* only, and not *real.*

Mr. Kett gives no such view of this matter. He tells his reader, after the example of all old treatises, that there are six *Fallaciæ Dictionis*, and seven *Fallaciæ extra Dictionem*, giving a formal list of each. I wish my reader would refer to this chapter, and he will perceive what it is to make Logic easy. Mr. K. sherks the second, fifth, and sixth of the first sort; he gives no notice when he enters upon the second sort, of which he omits the fifth and seventh, and throws the others out of their order, treating the two first, last. The absurdities and mistakes are besides numerous.

Under *Fallacia Æquivocationis*, he has this inexplicable nonsense.

"To this *cause* may be attributed many syllogisms that "are faulty, [syllogisms attributed to a cause!] *because* "they have an *anceps medium; either because* the Middle "term is taken twice particularly .... *or because* the "terms of the conclusion are not taken in the same sense "both in the premisses and in the conclusion." p. 81.

Old Menedemus exclaimed upon a much slighter occasion,

> Quæ sunt dicta in stultum, caudex, stipes, asinus, plumbeus,
> In illum nihil potest: exsuperat ejus stultitia hæc omnia.

The true doctrine is plain enough. The Middle term is ambiguous if it be not *once distributed*, just as much as if it be an equivocal word.

Now take an example of *Fallacia Compositionis.* "Be- "cause the Scripture says, that as there was a decree "from Augustus, that *all the world* should be taxed, "therefore America was included." The dulness that could lead him to produce this for an example of *Fallacia Compositionis* is inconceivable, after having himself placed a similar fallacy under *Equivocation.* The term *world* is *equivocal;* it is not used in a *divided sense* first, and then in a *compounded sense.*

Now for *Fallacia Divisionis.* This, he says, takes place when "that which is *expressed* in a compound sense "is *inferred* in a divided one." His own example will run thus:

> *The Planets are seven:*
> *Jupiter and Saturn are Planets;* therefore
> *Jupiter and Saturn are seven.*

Surely every one must see that *Planets, the Middle term,* is the word in which the fallacy lies; and yet its second meaning is *inferred,* is it, Mr. Kett? What an unfortunate propensity you labour under, to put the Middle term into the Conclusion! Vid. p. 23. Something perhaps

is owing to Aldrich's Latin: "Quando *datum* in sensu "composito *sumitur* in diviso;" *datum*, expressed, *sumitur*, inferred! How hard that *popular* treatise is to construe!

Now for *Non causâ pro causâ*. Having given the example in Aldrich about Astrology, he says in the next paragraph, "A *branch* of this sophism .... may be ex- "emplified by the credulity of persons of former times, "who maintained, that comets and eclipses were the "causes, or necessary forerunners .... of disasters," &c. The very example already produced. What *does* this mean? Is it absolute infatuation?

Towards the close of this precious chapter, he says, in substance, p. 87, The best method of avoiding sophistry, is to *consider* whether or not we are disputing with a sophist; and (what is strangest of all) "to con- "sider whether he be *competent* to conduct us to the "truth he professes to *investigate*." I do not wonder at his not knowing the difference between *investigating* and *syllogizing*; but as to *competency* being any criterion of a sophist, Aristotle, if he ever read him, would have taught him better; Σοφιστὴς μὲν, κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικὸς δὲ, οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν. Rhet. i. i. 4.

The last paragraph is perhaps taken from his Emily. It has nothing whatever to do with Logic. It is a touch of the *sentimental*.

"The fallacies that have been explained are not "those only against which we ought diligently to be "upon our guard. There are others that may be more "likely to seduce us from truth; such as self-love, un- "reasonable prejudice, party spirit, pride, indolence, and "the various passions of the heart. It is of little use for "the student to be a proficient in the rules of Logic, if "he submit himself a prey to those enemies to sound "judgment," &c. &c. &c. p. 87.

Let us only suppose a Professor of Geometry to address his class, at the close of a course of lectures, in a similar strain.

"And now, gentlemen, let me observe to you, that the "lines and angles you have been considering are not "those always which you will have to meet with in the "superficies of life. Let me advise you to avoid those "curves and spiral windings, in which the ablest Mathe- "maticians have been lost; especially that osculating "circle, which may seduce even the wisest among you, "and bring after it incalculable mischief. Gentlemen, "keep to the rectangle. It will be in vain even that you "aspire after the parabola, the hyperbola, or the ellipse, "if you suffer yourselves to be tickled by the tangents "of low desire. The vertex of the cone, be assured, will "be unsteady, unless its base be firm. It will be of lit- "tle use, &c. &c. &c."

After this manner, how many pages might be filled! But let me not be thought to insinuate, that the author himself supposed this to be a part of Logic. No. It is a part of the trade. Many a fond mother is captivated by this miserable cant.

Before I quit this subject of fallacies, let me observe, that the ordinary examples are seldom of much use to the learner. The fallacy is too obvious: it is detected already, by being thrown into the form of a syllogism. The real fallacy is such an ingenious mixture of falsehood and truth, so entangled, so intimately blended, that the falsehood is, to use a chemical phrase, *held in solution*. One drop of sound Logic is that test, which instantly disunites them, makes the foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom. If any one would see a beautiful course of experiments of this sort, let him read Chillingworth against Knot.

Mr. Kett is but a sorry Chemist in this way. He calls the following a *concealed fallacy*. p. 79.

" *Water freezes in Russia, in Germany, in France, and* " *in England; therefore, water freezes in all parts of the* " *world.*"

Chap. VII.

Method, and its Application.

From this chapter I shall quote three paragraphs, leaving them to the consideration of those whom they most concern. The first is for the Professor of Botany.

" We may know superficially what plants are; but it " is by the information which the study of Botany gives, " that we become instructed in the component parts of " any one, and distinguish *its respective pointals, stamens,* " *and class.*"

The next is for the Reader in Mineralogy.

" We may likewise have a *vague notion* of a mineral; " but it is by the study of Mineralogy we become ac- " quainted with the fourfold division of minerals into " earths and stones, which form one class; and salts, in- " flammables, and metallic substances, which form the " remaining three classes. This is analytic method, and " is called the method of invention."

The last is for the Professor of Poetry. It may serve to dissipate the clouds of confusion from his lectures.

" In Poetry, some regard to the order of ideas is ne- " cessary: even in an ode, the most desultory of all its " species, *the poet must conform to that arrangement of* " *ideas, which the description of each object requires:* with- " out *such* regard to method, his description will have " neither force to strike, nor beauty to charm his readers."

These are given as brief specimens how easy other things, as well as Logic, may be made by a man of true

genius. It is a species of writing, however, which is seldom understood, till we have thoroughly learnt in some other way that subject which is thus facilitated. You will not therefore take it amiss if I advise you to put off the easy method till you have learnt the hard one. I have had some experience in books myself, and I have uniformly met with disappointment from such books as these, whenever I have been desirous of easing my *mind*. On some other occasions I admit their use is great, and the want of them may be truly embarrassing. It is the only consolation which I can offer to the purchasers of the works I have been just considering, and happy may they think themselves that they have this alternative; more especially in the case of treatises on Logic, where nothing but instruction to the understanding is expected. For if they fail in this one object, they have nothing left that can redeem them; and I see no reason why they should not be tried by a law taken from the stern code of Parnassus,

Si paullum *summo* decessit, vergit ad *imum*.

PART IV.

Chap. I.

The Application of Logic to Literature and Science.

I do not mean to say much of Mr. Kett in this part. We differ *toto cælo* in our primary notion of Logic. *He* says, " Logic has Reason for its guide." p. 96. *I*, on the contrary, have always looked upon Logic as *the guide for Reason*. His notion, however, is perfectly consistent with what he observed of the *first operation* of the mind. [Vid. p. 10, *of this pamphlet, where the reader will see as curious a specimen of* Simple *Apprehension as he ever met with.*] As that was *made* for the sake of the first part of his Logic, so *Reason* was naturally enough intended for the whole treatise.

Another point of difference between us is this. *He* says, "The descriptive, the figurative, and the sublime, "are regulated by *its* laws," i. e. the laws of Logic. Now all these matters, according to my notion, are quite out of its jurisdiction*.

Let me now proceed to explain very briefly some of the notions concerning Logic, which have been long familiar to my mind.

In the first place, Logic, as it is generally taught, is rather an Art of Language than an Art of Reason. Its

* As I take my leave here of *Logic made easy*, I may as well give a short account of the rest of that treatise.

In Chap. II. Mr. K. praises Paley highly and deservedly; but I should hardly have expected to hear that it was a rare combination of faculties to be *acute without precipitation*, or *argumentative without frivolousness*. Such, however, was Paley. His Evidences, Mr. K. observes, exhibit *that harmony of parts, in which consists the essence of truth*. He proceeds; "*It* "*is this harmony of many parts*, all conspiring to form a grand whole, "which stamp the Christian religion with the *seal of indisputable and per-* "*fect veracity*, evinces its divine origin, and entitles it to the homage of "mankind." I cannot agree with him, but I am still a Christian.

The Chapter on Locke is the best in the book. He seems really to have read Locke's Essay, although to have read it more from a desire to write about it than to think about it. One ground of his respect for it is, that "it has been published in numerous editions." In p. 104, I fancy I hear some other person's voice, not Mr. Kett's; but I cannot tell whose. That part is plain and sensible. When it is said, [p. 109.] "that the Essay forms "a system of sublime philosophy relative to one of the most *curious subjects* "that can occupy the attention of the logical student," I am sure I hear him again.

As for the rest, I would advise the reader to stop here. If he is bent upon going on, as I have been the road myself, I can give some directions.

There is a tolerable piece of smooth turf, over which you may canter agreeably enough, from p. 111. to p. 116, done at little expence to the author, as the materials were wheeled in chiefly from the Life of Bacon. After that it grows much worse, till at length you get into very bad galloping ground indeed—a dark, narrow, winding, stony, Devonshire lane, of the author's own mending, with large lumps, such as Metaphysics, Ontology, Psychology, lying in the middle of the way, without any attempt to break them, and the hedges on each side so high and luxuriant, that you know not where you are going. Presently, however, through the boughs, you see some capital letters, which, upon coming nearer, are found to be the sign of the Parish Clerk's house, close to the church-yard gate, where you may dismount. There is an Advertisement at the church-door, which you may read or not, as you please.

business is to make words subservient to the purpose of communicating our opinions and reasonings to one another. In this character alone Logic considers language. It *excludes* all that is addressed to the fancy or the feelings; all that constitutes the grace, the beauty, the variety, the harmony, the elegance of composition. It confines itself strictly to the Understanding. Even those expedients, which the closest reasoners must adopt in practice, in order to gain attention, and to make impression on their hearers, are foreign to pure Logic. It never seeks to please, its sole aim is to instruct.

An argument then, framed according to the strict rules of Logic, would be firm and solid, but if nothing else were added, it would be unfit for use. It is the shell merely, the strong-jointed frame-work, upon which the ornamental, and many even of the useful parts, will be surmounted afterwards, according to the design of the edifice, and the taste or fancy of the architect. Let us not then turn from this necessary though elementary part of literature. If we are too squeamish to handle this cheerless and meagre skeleton, we may talk indeed of the beautiful contrivance of lacteals and absorbents, of nerves, veins, arteries, and muscles; we may admire, and even examine, the texture of that membrane with which the whole body is enveloped; but it will be all *talk*, the prattling of a superficial sciolist, who is for ever liable to place his arteries where his veins should be, his vessels where they have nothing to carry off, his nerves where they can have no sensation, and his muscles where they can have no play. It will be time enough to hide the bare ribs with their decent clothing, when the purpose for which they were exposed to the eye is fully answered: when we shall have acquired so perfect and familiar a knowledge of their situation and use, that the swell and action of the muscles, and the graceful covering of the

skin, shall not hide them from our mind, although the view of them may be intercepted from the eye. To act otherwise is to begin entirely at the wrong end. To attempt to rig the vessel before he sees that her main timbers are sound, is a sort of ship-building of which an Englishman should be ashamed.

Of the various purposes then which Language may be made to serve, the first in order and in utility is that which Logic regulates. This may be placed at one extremity of the series. At the other extremity is Poetry, where language, as well as thought, is made subservient to the production of a refined pleasure. The several gradations of the scale between these extreme points are occupied by the various branches of Rhetoric, taking Rhetoric in its most extensive signification as the art of good writing. To demonstrate the reason of those principles which conduce to the end of good writing, to shew how they depart, and why they depart, from the rigid laws of Logic, is one of the most grateful services which philosophy can render to polite literature. When we measure these anomalies, as they may be called, by that standard, we better know how to estimate their propriety, their congruity, their relative force, and their utility. The doing of this, I admit, belongs to the province of Rhetoric, but without Logic it cannot be done.

There is, moreover, an advantage in this study, more plain, indeed, and homely, but which I mention with a sincere and serious conviction of its use, that it will keep you from writing *nonsense*. Considering how much of the literature of this age, and of every age, is tinctured with that ingredient, I cannot think it a purpose foreign to education, to discipline a young mind in such a way as shall give it a quick perception of so disgraceful a fault: and I am not afraid even of contradiction, when I affirm, that the practice of analysing argumentative passages

into the syllogistic elements of which they are composed, will breed a habit of attention to the solid contents of every thing which is heard or read. Would any man, for instance, who had learnt Logic in the plain way in which it is now taught in Colleges, have committed to paper such a sentence as this? "By *considering* the peculiarities "of language, the various kinds of words and ideas, the "generalization *and* abstraction of ideas, the nature of "definition, division, and method, they [Lord Bacon and "Mr. Locke] *have shewn* that these topics are essential "to the *consideration of Logic*; and that Aristotle, *by ana-* "*lysing them with precision, and discussing them at large,* "*formed the most accurate conception* of the operations of "the human mind, and built his system upon the solid "ground of right reason." (*Logic made easy*, p. 10.) There are a hundred such passages in the works of the same author; it is the general character of his style. The extracts made by Mr. Davison are chiefly selected by him for the erroneous statements which they contain. If he had extended his criticism to this part, his work must have been more than double its present size.

I will produce one more from the popular novel, entitled *Emily*. A father is recommending to his daughter the habit of self-command; and dates his letter, I believe, *Lorton House*.

"*Self-command exercises its noblest office*, when it en- "ables us to maintain the dignity of our nature as intel- "ligent beings, by *establishing the empire of reason over* "*the passions*. It renders a person the *master of himself* "under all the various circumstances of life. . . . . It "gives an effectual *check to all the vicious propensities* of "envy, malice, and anger." (*Emily*, vol. ii. p. 60.) The poor colonel has so little command of *himself*, that he tries the patience of his daughter by this sort of advice, through a letter of *thirteen pages*.

I cannot afford room for much more. But the critical examination of such works is a useful exercise. Mr. Davison has made the Elements of General Knowledge much more valuable to the world than I ever imagined they could become. He has used them, as the Spartans used a drunken Helot, to shew their rising youth the contemptible nature of that folly. If any thing I have said entitles me to act the part of a serious adviser, let me earnestly recommend you to read that criticism with attention. I am sure you will be repaid. Not only will the different action of the two minds upon the same subject exhibit in the strongest light, by the aid of contrast, the right use of reason, and the perversion or the want of it, but the solid information contained is worth much more than the time you will be required to bestow upon it.

The form of the Syllogism, the varieties of Mood and Figure, every one knows, must be kept out of sight, when he brings his reasoning to bear on the occasions of real life. But is it not thus with every art? Has not a poet embodied the principle in a line so hacknied, that I might have expected it even in *Logic made easy*?

> As those move easiest who have learned to dance.

And where is the harm of practising a few minuet-steps of reasoning in a tutor's room, before the student goes forth into the throng of life; especially, since, by a law of Convocation, which I cannot think a very wise one, all our public balls and rehearsals in that way are now suppressed*? After all, we pay no honours to this accomplishment, although we lay great stress upon it.

* I have seen a very elegant poem, written by a Lady, on the occasion of Minuets being stopped at Court, by order of the Lord Chamberlain. It was entitled, "The Death of the Minuet." Might not the Death of the Syllogism give play to some chaste academical wit?

The most expert proficient in the *Form* of Logic has no right to say more than this.

> —— Vitavi denique culpam,
> Non laudem merui.

As to the *Matter* of Logic, I cannot bring myself in this σχεδίασμα, to submit to you my present thoughts. On that subject I may, perhaps, one day address you again, when my speculations shall be more settled, and nothing will occur to prevent me from discussing it with that uniform seriousness of manner which belongs to such a subject.

In the present undertaking, next to saving the inexperienced among you from errors which might be deeply injurious, I have been guided chiefly by a desire to take out, if possible, that offensive canker, which corrodes and disfigures us in the sight of the world. For this purpose I have not scrupled to employ all the implements, the most keen and the most caustic, which the school of criticism could furnish. The operation is a severe one; but no other could be of use. I have strong confidence that this will succeed.

My object, I repeat it, is not to starve the author's trade. If he must still continue to extract his *essences* and *cordials*, if he must keep his *distillery* going, let him at least remove it to some place where it will be felt as a less nuisance to the neighbourhood, and in all probability he will thrive. The voice of criticism will be faintly heard at Tunbridge or at Birmingham, or will be drowned amidst the discordant cries of London. But let him not defile and poison *us* with his fumes. Let him not insult us, by driving his disreputable traffic on, under the very nose of authority. Let him not seek to smuggle his illicit wares through the Clarendon Press, before the eyes of those, whose especial duty it is regularly to administer

the established laws, and to watch over the interests of sound learning.

With such an antagonist I should have deemed it inglorious and degrading to myself to contend, except in what I firmly believed to be a public cause. As a writer, (I will even risk the imputation of arrogance in saying it,) he is entirely beneath my notice. What I hope I have convinced you of is, that as a writer he is equally beneath yours.

Neither is it according with my disposition and habits to engage in the task of severe criticism. There is nothing so perfect which may not be exposed and ridiculed in some of its parts. And there is no employment, in my opinion, more unmanly, more unbecoming a person of liberal education, than malignant carping—prying and *picking holes* in things, which are in the main respectable and useful. The present Pamphlet, I am well aware, would not be proof against such treatment. Of one defect, which it is now too late to remedy, I am myself very sensible—a want of *keeping* in the whole composition. But *Haste*, which is a plea in most cases inadmissible, will, I hope, be listened to, and allowed here.

The first object of my undertaking was to lay an injunction upon a mischief rapidly increasing. Mr. Kett's publication I had not seen till long after the term commenced. Having heard it laughed at, I sent for it; and the first ten pages which I read determined me upon the step I have here taken. There was no time to be lost. My intention was advertised before a word of the Pamphlet was written, in order that the evil might receive some check immediately. In the mean time I have not been idle: but the particular and positive duties in which I am engaged, and which I have no *right* to abandon for the sake of a voluntary service, however important and

pressing in its own nature, have left me only some scanty intervals of leisure for this work. Thus, under different humours and impressions, at short snatches of opportunity, sheet after sheet has been written, and wafted to the press by various gales of feeling: gales, which I admit an Ulysses, under the guidance of Mentor, would not have released from their secret prison, but yet none of which, I trust, has been found so light and baffling, as to interfere materially with my progress; none so stormy, as to interrupt the steerage of justice and reason.

Here then, if any where, my defence must rest. But my labours are not yet over. This effort, which I venture to hope will not be thought altogether injudicious or unavailing, will probably be followed up by one directed against a different enemy, and provoked by an offence of greater magnitude. If the vile imposture of *quackery* deserves to be scourged and pilloried, the foul lurking fiend of *defamation*, of deliberate and systematic defamation, must not be allowed to spit his venom with impunity. Whatever may be the strength of that cavern in which he lies concealed, from that cavern he shall be dragged. The enterprise may be hazardous, but the cause inspires me. I have begun, indeed, with chasing a flea; I shall end, perhaps, with rousing a lion.

THE END.